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AHMED SHEIKH*

Analysis of Contemporary International
Law Development- A Social
Psychological Perspective
Introductory Comments
The study of international law by social scientists is in decline. There are
many reasons for this loss of interest, among the main ones being: (1) A
sense of the irrelevance of international law as a factor in world politics which
stems from the spectacle of nations revolting against the rules of law, disregarding them altogether, or choosing to apply only those laws which conform to their interests. Where there is a discrepancy between the way groups
actually behave and the norms that prescribe how they ought to behave,
social scientists whose primary concern is the former, tend to disregard the
latter; (2) A sense of the futility of traditional methods of teaching international law. Social scientists are impatient with a discipline that seems to
focus exclusively either on a close universe of norms-their logical consequences, their hierarchy, their interconnections-divorced from the political and social universe in which they appear and which they try to regulate,
or on doctrinal interpretations and desiderata which, while they take pclitical
and social purposes into account, represent only the idiosyncratic views of
irrelevant if respectable writers.
With these words, a few years ago Stanley Hoffman' warned us of a
growing distance between international law and political science-a distance which is all too frequently fostered by many scholars who, it is
feared, continue to take refuge in the comforting seclusion from realities of
international politics, which the pure theory of law has always provided.
If this trend is to be reversed at all, and the study of international law
made more meaningful both to the social scientist and the student in the
classroom, fresh efforts must now be made to recognize and assess the
underlying realities of international politics as exhibited in state behavior
and reflected in the development of contemporary international law itself.
The study of international law must be carried out in the context of
contemporary international politics: for it is the essence and logic of the
politics which in reality are magnified and often starkly reflected in in*Associate Professor of Political Science at Marshall University, Huntington, West
Virginia; B.A., M.A. (Sacramento State College), M.A., Ph.D. (University of Oregon).
'The State of War: Essays in Theory and Practiceof InternationalPolitics (New York:
F. A. Praeger, Inc., 1965), pp. 123-124.
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ternational law. If international law seems condemned today as Hoffman
implies, to all the weaknesses and perversions that it is so easy to deride,
the nature of international politics is responsible for its state.
In a decentralized and fragmented world of some hundred and forty odd
independent states with different value systems and foreign policy goals,
it would be difficult to develop a single global perspective from which each
state's efforts to make international law either serve its national interests or
disregard it completely in other situations, could be viewed; but the task is
not an impossible one if new conceptualizations are used.
Since the logic of international politics is best expressed in the language
of political conflict, competition, and only at times cooperation, among
states which are neither linked by strong consensus nor by a central common authority, it is suggested that our analysis of contemporary international law-making may do well to use this "fact of life" as a starting
point, and thus to avoid the pitfalls of the past in which it was often
assumed that conceptions such as "laws of civilized nations" or "common
2
law of mankind" etc., are valid.
The task of analyzing law through politics is obviously much easier and
perhaps less necessary in domestic legal systems where the political relationship is usually well known; but the situation is not comparable in the
international system. Thus, in the process of analyzing international law,
we must not hesitate to ask even the most fundamental political questions
that may not seem crucial in a domestic context-questions such as: how
does the consensus for the rules of international law develop today? Within
the "community" of nations whose will and interests does this consensus
really reflect? Apart from noisy proclamations and solemn statements by
large and small nations alike to uphold the law, which geographical and
other jurisdictions do these legal rules actually cover, and under what
circumstances? Do these rules really constitute a restraint on state behavior, or do they simply consecrate, or even enhance a state's freedom to do
what it pleases?
Only through systematic studies of states' attitudes and beliefs, their
ideological preferences and their disparate value systems which they invariably introduce into the international bargaining process as prior to
consensus formation, can we, as a first step, learn how mutual consensus
on legal norms are reached, and agreement is reached on treaties which
subsequently lead to law development on the contemporary international
scene. Such studies, secondly, in the long run, can also help us to ascertain
what states are most likely to violate or uphold what kinds of international
laws and under what political circumstances.
2

H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965 ed.).
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What is being suggested here is that our purpose of analysis should not
be limited to the mere attainment of some new insights into the study of
progressive and pragmatic development of new laws per se, but we should
also make some assessment, tentative as it may be, with regard to their
future effectiveness as impartial arbiters of international disputes.
In our task of analyzing law through politics we should be concerned
particularly with the specific forms of state behavior with unique features
which can be identified as impinging upon the process of international
law-making. These unique features are to be found in those international
actions which Raymond Aron once aptly called a state's "diplomatic-strategic" behavior. 3 It is a kind of behavior which is highly competitive,
often conflictive, and almost always takes place under an implicit or explicit threat of violence.
Since the competitive-conflicting nature of this diplomatic-strategic state
behavior obliges the actors to calculate their motives and moves in terms of
not always well-defined and well-articulated national interests, it can best
be understood only if we study it both in terms of actions oriented toward
4
values and goals and in terms of instrumental state actions.

In short, there is a great need for new conceptualizations, approaches
and models which can help us identify and analyze a number of crucial, and
so far neglected, sets of variables responsible for the dynamic relationship
between international politics and international law, particularly the variables which play a significant part in the process of law-making. Only in
this manner, can we heed the above-quoted warning of Stanley Hoffmann,
and make the study of international law more relevant, both to the social
scientist and the student in the classroom.
The Approach
It is believed that the relevant variables can best be identified, and their
relationships analyzed, through a social-psychologicalapproach to states'

behavior in various international bargaining situations, leading eventually
to the formulation of accepted international conventions and the subsequent development of international law. Such an approach can effectively
assist us in integrating, for instance, a number of important factors prevalent in a state's diplomatic-strategic behavior; e.g., (1) the background
social and cultural factors of a state, and the limitations which these factors
pose in the international arena; (2) the military, technical and industrial
3
Peace and War: A Theory of InternationalRelations (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1968
ed.), pp. 580-585, 591-600.
4See E. M. Schur, Law and Society: A Sociological View (New York: Random House,
1968).
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position of a state vis-h-vis other states; (3) national goals and "other"
motives which a state brings to the bargaining table; (4) the process of
negotiations which itself involves moves, counter-moves and various types
of communications; (5) the nature of the international climate under which
negotiations are conducted; and (6) the outcomes, and the degree of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with them, etc.
Acceptance of an international legal norm by states, binding them to
certain prescribed patterns of behavior, is contingent upon a consensus on
a set of broader value systems underlying that norm. The broader value
system held by a state in a given period of history is essentially the product
of a number of these crucial sets of social-psychological, political-cultural
and military-industrial variables which should be identified, and their impact assessed, both on the formation of a state's national objectives and on
the process of international bargaining and consensus development, prior
to law-making. Only in this manner can we be in a position to identify the
crucial relationship between international law and international politics,
and reach some tentative conclusion with regard to future state behavior
vis-a-vis specific international laws.
The significance of these variables on the development of consensus on
the broader value system (which must underlie legal norms if laws are to be
effective), can partially be ascertained by an analysis of present trends
toward "lawlessness" and breakdown of traditional patterns of "law and
order" in some communities in the United States today. For instance, one
can argue that the new social and political awareness on the part of the
black American community, coupled with its increasing demands for more
physical and psychological gratifications, has brought home at least one
important fact-the traditional consensus which we once took for granted
on the broader value system underlying some of our laws, can no longer be
5
said to exist.
On the international scene also, a comparable situation is developing;
with the emergence, during the past two decades, of dozens of new sovereign states with different value systems and foreign policy objectives, many
of the so-called cherished principles of international law of the past (based
on Western character and representing primarily Western values) are under
heavy attack. These "laws" are frequently violated by the countries of the
Third World which took no part in their development.
Without attempting to diverge into philosophical arguments on the nature of various societal orders, it will suffice simply to suggest at this point,
that "law" ideally functions as a restraining force on uninhibited state
5
Fortas, Concerning Dissent and Civil Disobedience (New York: The World Publishing
Co., 1968).
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behavior only when it is considered to be an impartial arbiter of disputes by
all parties. To the extent that today's international law, and the institutions
created to provide a structural framework for its formulation, fail to impart
this image, they cannot hope to function effectively as a restraining force
on uninhibited state behavior. To achieve this impartial, and therefore
effective, framework it seems necessary to obtain the required consensus
for future laws by creating a community of interests among states. Perhaps
only in this manner may we still have a chance of reaching the end goal of a
world of law.
First of all, it seems desirable to re-define or perhaps re-assess the true
nature and role of contemporary international law for the purpose of our
approach. In the broadest sense, the function of law, both municipal and
international, is to serve the interests of its citizens by normalizing, i.e.,
standardizing, their relationships with one another. In a social sense, law
aims to foster a community of interests and values by providing the maximum satisfaction of desired ends for a vast majority with a minimum of
inconvenience, sufferings or deprivations for the minority. In an economic
sense, law attempts to limit the choice of alternatives available, along with
the scope and intensity of conflicting interests of nations in the competitive
pursuits of their national goals.
Most importantly, international law, in a political sense, performs a
number of crucial functions: as suggested earlier, it enhances cooperation
among states through standardizing techniques and patters aimed at limiting interstate conflict; i.e., it attempts to serve as an impartial framework
for the process of international decisions. In a decentralized and heterogeneous world of multiple states, it serves as an instrument of communication by providing a common language and a joint frame of reference. In
the process of foreign policy-making, it frequently serves as a tool in the
sense that states do indeed use legal arguments to protect or enhance a
particular position.
All of this is essentially done by using law as a means of putting pressure
on the adversary through mobilization of international support, and thus
internationalizing a national interest. But, at the same time, the inherent
ambiguities of international law in other situations enable policy-makers to
dismiss international law altogether as irrelevant, as if it were neither a
guide nor a restraint.
In the international arena attention inevitably focuses on the impact of
non-satisfaction of state demands on international law-making; for states
are under no obligations voluntarily to accept deprivation or frustration of
their national objectives. Thus, in the actual process of law-making they
must entertain various notions of bargaining as a part of their diplomatInternational Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 4
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ic-strategic behavior and their incentive to compete and even conflict,
Within this wider framework we must also take into account characteristics
peculiar to states' behavior as a result of their disparate broader value
systems which they interject in the process of negotiations.
One cannot afford to ignore the international environmental factors
either, within which the process of law development must take place, and
which, in fact, subsequent laws must reflect. For instance, factors such as
the impact of the most recent weapons of mass destruction in international
politics; a general desire mutually to disarm as the initial Soviet-American
talks in Finland have indicated; a strong willingness to keep these weapons
out of such areas as outer space, the ocean floor, etc.; the significant role of
the emergent states in world politics; Sino-Soviet differences; and perhaps
most importantly, the role of supra-national and international organizations
which have introduced in the international environment new dimensions
which future international law-making and laws cannot ignore.
With growing membership and with an ever increasing functional complexity, some of these international organizations have become a revolutionary force in world affairs. 6 Their proliferation represents an effort on
the part of nation-states to reach out for new organizational forms of
cooperation in order to improve their economic health. These organizations
have meant the creation of new and important problem-solving capabilities
in the international system.
While the notion of "state sovereignty" remains intact, nonetheless, the
so-called impermeable nation-state is now frequently penetrated by the
activities of either these organizations or other states belonging to such
organizations. This statement is true of all nation-states which belong to
various functional international organizations regardless of their size or
relative powers. Relations among them are no longer confined, for all
practical purposes, to those involving formal government-to-government
contact.
This process of international integration through functional organizations, however extremely modest it may seem at the present, has great
significance for future international law-making. It tends to foster both a
broader value system among states, and a general consensus on the "rules
of the game" at the bargaining table.
Along with the above considerations in law-making, we must also not
neglect certain other characteristics peculiar to the international arena
which hinder this process. First of all, world authority is decentralized.
6

iack C. Piano and R. E. Rigs, Forging World Order: The Politics of International
Organization (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967); and D. W. Bowett, The Law of
International Institutions (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1963).
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There exists no supranational institution with absolute authority that could
use its centralized vantage point to mitigate and inhibit trends toward
international conflict.
Secondly, the nation-state remains the supreme actor. Given this fact,
the trend exists, without any possibility of substantial change in the near
future, that states will continue to define their supreme interests in national
rather than international terms. Generally speaking, states still find security
within their own societal orders and perceived and project images. The
inherent mistrust of elements external to their own order is rather strongly
and widely held.
Thirdly, at an international level "law" does not have an impartial
character. Not only is there a lack of effective institutions which can serve
as impartial arbiters of interstate disputes, but law itself has become tainted
with value-laden overtones. Many scholars such as McDougal, Burke,
Goldie, Lauterpacht, et al., conceive of law in terms of "reasonableness."
Yet reasonableness to one nation generally does not mean reasonableness
to others.
Thus, law is cloaked in the values of the historically stronger nations,
values which a majority of the weaker, newer nations of today simply do
not share. Consequently, if a state is not satisfied with a legal interpretation
of its rights and obligations under a particular law, it proceeds to choose
definitions which suit its needs and which it considers "morally" justified in
professing. Consider for instance current states' actions with regard to the
doctrine of the continental shelf: Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Panama and Costa
Rica claim a continental shelf area up to 200 miles from their national
borders; the United States and all North Sea state contestants also find
justification for expansion of their national jurisdictions. Thus, in this
situation, as indeed in many other new areas, one is faced with a lack of
consensus on both the procedure and substance of law.
Fourthly, one must accept the fact that states' interests are naturally
going to overlap, and even conflict. This is so because the complexities of
the modern world and the growing interdependence of nations mean more
state activities, both in scope and intensity, beyond the confines of national
borders.
In attempting to construct an approach aimed at understanding the
development of international law through politics, one must consider more
than the prevailing conditions of the international environment. What must
somehow be done is to investigate whether there is a possibility for states
to build into the international system, conditions by which meaningful
alternatives to conflict can be identified by these states to give them greater
flexibility in pursuing their foreign policy objectives.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 4, No. 4
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To achieve this condition, aside from building into the framework calculations on perceptions of strength of state-interest in an issue, one must
consider alternative means by which to achieve areas of consensus on
values; for, a consensus on values is a prime factor in reducing misjudgments and in creating voluntary obedience to law. A number of writers
have suggested, in this regard, that some standardization of values can be
achieved by relying on the language (and values) of a technological
elite-values such as "efficiency", "competition", "stability", etc. These
"values" are said to be impartial because of their relationship to the laws of
science.
Yet, as recent events in Vietnam, the Middle East, and Czechoslovakia
have demonstrated, one must create, as a preliminary step, the necessary
cross-national contacts in order for such "standardized" values to have
enough impact on foreign policy considerations, the latter of which may be
said to blend functional rationality with social, psychological and cultural,
as well as political variables. Conceivably, to a certain extent, this desired
impact (a standardization of values) might already have been achieved
because the values of technocrats and expertise are already standard; i.e.,
stability, efficiency, order, etc., and since anything which is perceived as a
threat to these values is frequently met with a common reaction from all
quarters.
In this case, what we need to do is to extend the commonality of these
values to the realm of international law to the extent to which that is now
possible. However, the perception of specific values to be promoted in
international law in terms of priorities, may vary from nation to nation to
such an extent that the desired impact may be minimized. For example, the
value of "competition" might be promoted actively by nation X, which
then translates this value objective into a policy of expansion of its foreign
trade market which the international law may be required to reflect. Nation
Y, on the other hand, may perceive "stability", i.e., a lack of competition,
as its first priority. Its policy objective may be to strengthen its own
position by having international law reflect norms prohibiting entry of
others into the foreign market which it controls.
Despite the above kind of difficulties, substantive cross-systemic contacts, cross-national trade ties, mutual regional development pacts, and
memberships in various functional organizations as a whole can best lead
to common perceptions of value and similar interpretation and analysis of
"issues," for purposes of law development. While not precluding an area of
exclusive interest, one should admit that the above also does not preclude
an area of common interest-or the feeling that an "issue" has some
modicum of mutual interest in several countries, that there are parameters
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 4
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to these interests, and that somewhere in between these parameters there
are areas of mutually perceived accommodations which may result in the
development of new international laws.
What has not been mentioned in the above references to cross-systemic
contacts is common, or lack of common, ideology. The types of
cross-systemic contacts described up to this point-especially those which
can provide the depth of contact necessary to have an impact on policy
considerations- may generally exist among states with similar ideologies.
They may not exist, at least in any large measure, among states which
possess conflicting ideologies. However, because of a variety of reasons
this may now be changing.
It can be argued that in most nation-states today there is a predictable
and measureable gap between the public espousal of whatever widely-held
ideology a nation may have and its actual translation into public policies
including foreign policy. As a matter of fact, in recent years it has become
quite fasionable for many international and national actors, particularly in
the emergent states, to espouse consummatory ideologies purely for the
psychic gratifications, their own and those of their masses. This seemingly
makes international compromises on "issues" (i.e., future international
laws) more difficult to achieve.
But in reality, these states find no conflict whatsoever in developing
foreign-policy goals, significantly free of professed ideological constraints,
and more attuned to the pragmatic needs of their nations. To the extent
that this new pragmatism has become a significant force in the international
arena today, it may well continue to widen the gap between ideology and
policy, thus making compromises necessary for consensus formulation and
subsequent law development, among nations holding conflicting ideologies,
7
much easier to attain.
The above process has already begun. In recent years, both super-powers have shown a predisposition to close an era of "confrontation,"
and enter into a decade of "negotiation," regardless of their ideological
differences. A number of important international treaties recently signed by
these two nations and subsequently ratified by many other countries are an
indication of this predisposition. Present talks on strategic arms limitation
and on keeping the sea-bed free of weapons of mass destruction, can also
be cited as indications of more pragmatic forms of cooperation.
In terms of changing public attitudes, too, one can discern the emergence of faint signs which may be replacing notions such as "better dead
than Red," "right or wrong my country," "President knows best," etc.,
7

Fred C. kle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1967 ed.).
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with that of "friendly communist nations," "you can do business with the
other side," "mutual survival," etc. The emergence of more bureaucratic,
business-like, and technologically-oriented elites in the Soviet Union, and
the modernizing military elites in the developing countries, are also helpful
signs in this evolution.
The emphasis on "state" as a proper unit of analysis for our approach
seems logical simply because, despite persistent attempts of various functional and other world organizations to introduce some measure of international integration, the nation-state remains the most significant operating unit in the international scene up to the present time. All attempts to
extend the realm of international jurisdiction have been greeted, more often
than not, with traditional arguments in support of "state sovereignty,"
supremacy of "national interests," etc. Thus, it is the complex inter-relationship of these states across their national frontiers that give the
fields of international politics and international law both their form and
substance.
In a very broad sense, while the discipline of international politics is the
study of those patterns of behavior which accompany state activities across
state boundaries, international law may be regarded, among other things, as
an attempt to organize and structure these patterns of behavior in an
orderly framework designed to enhance cooperation among states, through
standardizing techniques and patterns aimed at limiting interstate conflict
to certain generally accepted forms and levels of overt and covert international violence. In a strict legal sense, international law may be considered an attempt to serve as an impartial framework of reference for the
process of international claims and decisions.
The Model
Our model is concerned primarily with conceptualizing the intricate
process of international negotiations and bargaining, leading up to consensus formulation prior to development of new international laws. It
assumes that most international laws of the future will be consensual norms
developed as a result of international treaties agreed through the process of
negotiation and bargaining. The participants in these negotiations clearly
act as representatives of their respective governments rather than as individuals.
Their freedom of action is restricted to varying degrees depending,
among other factors, on the significance of their status within the decision-making hierarchy of their own countries. But those negotiators who
come with practically no instructions at all, and consequently possess a
significant degree of freedom to explore new opportunities presented at the
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 4, No. 4
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the bargaining table itself, still operate under a number of powerful constraints and stresses which are both internal and external. 8
The presence of these constraints and stresses in international negotiations is certainly one of the more significant characteristics in contrast to
other situations, in which the participants may be free to interact and react
spontaneously. It is also one of the most neglected factors in our analyses
of international negotiations. Given this situation, the model attempts to
raise such questions as: What forms and directions does the interaction
take? How are the processes and outcomes of the negotiations influenced
by the conditions under which these negotiations take place? How are they
altered, for instance, if negotiations are conducted under limited information or under conditions of stress? What effects do the pre-existing
mutual images of the negotiating countries, the personal characteristics of
the negotiators and their domestic systemic inputs, have on the negotiating
process and its outcomes? What latitude exists for accommodation purposes even when all the constraints and stresses have been taken into
consideration? What role do interpersonal factors of the negotiators play in
determining the course of interaction? etc.
The model conceives negotiations on international law-making, a process through which two or more sovereign states interact developing potential agreements to provide legal guidance and regulation of their future
international behavior. Within the context of this interaction, the focus of
the model is upon social psychological variables. This is certainly not to
suggest that lack of consensus among states results only because of misperception and misunderstanding. On the contrary, a lack of consensus
may well result from objective incompatibility of national objectives. However, the model assumes that even such obvious conflict of interests may
be sharpened or perpetuated indefinitely by various social psychological
factors and that these may influence its eventual outcome. 9
In its initial formulation our model is composed of five interdependent
components: (1) Preexisting background variables of national-cultural traditions, value-hierarchies, ideological preferences, and politico-military relations between negotiating parties. (2) National objectives which a state
brings to the bargaining table. These objectives, of course, play an important role in the formulation of a state's position vis-h-vis other states,
8
See J. David Singer (ed.), Human Behavior and International Politics: Contributions
from the Social Psychological Services (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965), particularly
Part 2.
9
1n support of this position, see R. C. Snyder, "Some Recent Trends in the International
Relations Theory and Research" in A. Ranney (ed.), Essays on the Behavioral Study of
Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 103-171; F. C. lkle, op. cit.; and J.
Bernard, "Some Current Conceptualizations in the Field of Conflict," American Journal of
Sociology, 70, 1965, pp. 442-452.
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because they require that the outcome of negotiations to result in the
satisfaction of these objectives; in the present case, development of a
complimentary and supportive set of laws. These objectives are generally
responsible for motivating a state to enter into negotiations in the first place
and then to keep them going. (3) Specific situational and current international environmental conditions under which negotiations are conducted. (4) The process of negotiation itself, which involves communications, bargaining for direct and side effects, formulation of various
strategies and tactics for negotiations, various moves, bluffs, threats of
negative sanctions and promises of rewards, etc. (5) The outcomes, which
are translated into formal treaties prior to law-development, and their
assessment in terms of cost and reward. The five components and their
relationship with each other are further explained in the first part of the
model in Figure 1 below:
BACKGROUND FACTORS
1. Social, Econ.,
Political,
Cultural
Variations
2. Value Hierarchies
3. Ideological
Preferences
4. Gen. Relations
among Parties,
etc.

NATIONAL
OBJECTIVES
1. Community of
Objectives
2. Specificity
of Objectives
3. Long/Short
Term
Objectives
4. Priorities
among Goals

PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION
1. Communications
2. Bargaining
3. Strategies
(Alliances, etc.)
4. Tactics (Bluffs,
Threats, Rewards, etc.)

OUTCOME
1.Clarity of
Outcomes
2. Degree of
Consensus
3. Development
of Treaties,
etc.
4. Estimation
of Cost/
Reward by
Each State,
for Short/
Long Terms

SITUATIONAL
FACTORS
I. International
Climate
(Mood)
2. Timings
3. Need for Results
4. Stresses on Negotiators,
etc.
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 4
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At the beginning of any international negotiation, it is useful to conceptualize the setting in terms of four major elements: (a) the parties to
negotiations; (b) the alternative actions which might be taken by each
party; (c) the various outcomes (decisions, treaties, laws, etc.) expected to
result from their combined action, and (d) the utility which each state
ascribes to each of the various outcomes. Such a formulation, originally
derived from game theory, can prove useful for both theory-building and
empirical research dealing international bargaining. Four elements are
placed in a decision matrix of outcomes and utilities which constitutes the
second part of our model. See Figure 2 below:
Exemplary matrix of outcomes and utilities when each of the nations may
alternatively give up its freedom of action by "compromising" and agreeing
to a particular set of laws of the sea OR "hold out" for status quo, that is,
"no laws".

Alternatives
for U.S.S.R.

Hold out for no
Laws of the sea developed
international restrictions as a result of compromise
on the state exploitation of between the two states
the sea-bed for national
military and economic
purposes.

Alternatives
for U.S.

Hold out for no
international restrictions
on the state exploitation of
the ocean floor for national
military and economic
purposes.

OUTCOME (A)
No laws of the sea (no
restrictions on state
activities in the area)
UTILITIES
0 for U.S.
0 for U.S.S.R.

OUTCOME (C)
Discriminatory laws
developed restricting only
U.S.S.R.'s freedom of
action in the area.
UTILITIES
+ 10 for U.S.
-

5 for U.S.S.R.

Laws of the sea developed OUTCOME (B)
OUTCOME (D)
as a result of compromise Discriminatory laws
Development of laws
between the two states,
developed restricting only restricting both countries'
U.S. freedom of action in activities in the area.
the area.
UTILITIES
UTILITIES
+ 5 for U.S.
+ 10 for U.S.S.R.
+ 5 for U.S.S.R.
-
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In the above figure, each of the two nations (U.S. and U.S.S.R. for
instance) can alternatively decide to restrict their freedom of action in the
international arena to a compromise level, by developing new international
laws, or "hold out" at the present no restriction level. The illustration of
current international negotiations on the question of the exploitation of the
ocean floor for economic and military purposes, and hopefully the subsequent development of new laws of the sea through a treaty, may be an
appropriate example in this context.
In this illustration involving restrictions on the use of area for military
and economic purposes, each of the two states can take certain actions
independently of the other or jointly. However, there are four possible
outcomes as indicated in the four cells of the matrix: (a) both nations may
retain the present situation of no restrictions at all, and consequently no
laws of the sea; (b) only United States' freedom of action may be restricted; (c) only Soviet Union's freedom of action may be restricted; or (d) both
super powers may agree to restrict their freedom of action by agreeing to a
treaty halting the spread of military hardware on the sea-bed and/or economic exploitation of the area for national self-interest.
Let each of the four outcomes have a certain utility for each country as
shown in this figure. The status quo of "no laws" in this instance may be
taken as a reference point, so that its continuing existence has a zero utility
for each party. The utilities of other outcomes are shown as incremental
amounts over the utility of status quo; the negative utility for a state, when
it alone decides to restrict its activity, represents a worsening of situation
over status quo for that nation. It must be remembered that the sum of the
utilities to the two countries involved is higher for some outcomes than for
others. That is, the matrix represents a non-constant-sum or non-zero-sum
situation, as is usually the case in most international bargaining.
In such international bargaining situations as the example under discussion, the utility of various outcomes can be assessed by judgmental
evaluation of policy-makers in each country as to whether the eventually
agreed laws of the sea will facilitate or frustrate the achievement of its
national interest both in the short and the long run. In the present negotiation matrix, the best outcome for either nation occurs when it retains its
freedom to use the area as it pleases while the other nation's freedom of
action is restricted.
In this matrix, it is also assumed that the international situation has
reached the point at which status quo, which allows each nation to choose
its own course of action independently, is not desired by either party.
When choices are made jointly rather than independently, it is useful to
regard them as being made among outcomes, four in the present situation,
rather than between (two) alternative actions.
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Thus, a decision matrix of independently chosen alternatives may be
constructed with a negotiation graph of jointly selected outcomes. The four
outcomes under discussion are plotted in a negotiation graph in Figure 3
hereunder, according to utilities which each outcome poses for the United
States and for the Soviet Union:
Graph of utilities for four possible outcomes when each of two negotiating
parties has the alternative of "compromising" and of "holding out":
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Some Tentative Conclusions

Perhaps with more optimism than is really warranted, it is hoped by the
present author, that accumulation of empirical findings resulting from the
employment of such social psychological models of observation in the
analysis of the actual process of contemporary international law-making,
will enable us to make the study of law more relevant to the social scientist
and the student in the classroom. Such an approach may also provide a
basis for the development of an integrative theory of international negotiation which will eventually no doubt be helpful in specifying all of the
critical elements of negotiations and their causal relationships. The model
also suggests that some coherence may be provided to specific findings that
we have now reached in dealing with particular failures of various international negotiations.
For the present, however, a model of this type, even in its rudimentary
and simplistic form, does accomplish three things: (1) it provides a useful
mode of identifying and organizing a number of social-psychological and
other variables associated with international negotiations and bargaining
prior to law-making; (2) it suggests certain significant relations among
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them; and (3) it helps us develop a framework which tends to accommodate various types and levels of negotiations and bargaining. Identification of these variables, as enumerated in the first part of the model, is
by no means an exhaustive list; but it is a start.
By using systematic nations the model emphasizes that analysis of international negotiations on future international law development must take
into consideration, not only the process of bargaining on the table but also
around it, before it and after it. Distinctions among these various aspects
of negotiation permit their essential differentiations. For instance, background factors and national objectives can be regarded as systemic inputs,
situational and environmental factors, along with the process of negotiation
itself, as decision-making or the conversion process, and the outcomes and
their estimation of cost and rewards in terms of the negotiating party's
preferences as outputs.
This type of systemic sequence, now fairly widely used in the analysis of
other political processes, at least does suggest some general direction of
influences which future international law-making and subsequent laws will
reflect. From this general direction of influence, we someday may be able
to identify more specific causal inferences.
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